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Introduction
Philip Jessup would not be pleased. Exactly sixty years after he published his
1
groundbreaking book on Transnational Law, a majority of voters in the United Kingdom
decided they wanted none of that. By voting for the UK to leave the European Union, they
rejected what may well be called the biggest and most promising project of transnational
law. Indeed, the European Union (including its predecessor, the European Economic
Community), is nearly as old Jessup’s book. Both are products of the same time. That
invites speculation that goes beyond the immediate effects of Brexit: Is the time of
transnational law over? Or can transnational law be renewed and revived?
It is worth remembering that Brexit is not an isolated event of anti-transnationalism. The
most successful transnational movement today is, ironically, nationalism. Nationalists and
populists in other EU Member States hope to ride the Brexit wave and inaugurate their
own exits in the name of national sovereignty: Italexit, Nexit and Frexit are more than just
idle word games. The EU might well collapse. And such nationalism, often with clear racist
tendencies, goes beyond Europe, and beyond states within organizations. In India, Modi
has instituted a new Hindu nationalism. In Russia, Putin is deploying a cynical form of
nationalism. And in the United States, Donald Trump has already suggested that his
campaign is about “the exact same thing” as Brexit, namely taking the country back from
cosmocrats and elites. This transnational nationalism is thus about more than just
membership in the EU. It is a movement for national strength, for closed borders, for
controlled or restricted trade. It wants to reestablish a traditional idea of a sovereign
nation state.
Leave voters have been called stupid, selfish, and xenophobic, among other things. Even if
this were true (it clearly is for some, but not necessarily for all), this would not prove much.
In a democracy everyone has the right to be stupid and also, up to a point, selfish and
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xenophobic. This is not petty: we leave to democratic votes precisely those questions of
politics that we do not feel we can decide objectively on a scientific basis, and we trust
people to determine for themselves what is best for them. Whether membership in the EU
should be open to a referendum is quite contestable. But once a referendum is called, it is
not easy to reject the result and simultaneously celebrate democracy. The arguments must
be taken seriously, even if we refuse to accept them. And they must inform our thinking
about transnational law, even if we refuse to adopt them.
Brexit as Rejection of Transnational Law
Brexit must be understood as a rejection of transnational law because, in many ways, the
European Unions is the epitome of transnationalism. Jessup himself, although primarily
interested in Asia, acknowledged as much. When Transnational Law was first published,
Jessup could only mention the European Coal and Steel Community, but he already
2
rejoiced that it had “blazed a trail for supranational authorities.” In Transnational Law,
Jessup famously defined transnational law “to include all law which regulates actions or
events that transcend national frontiers. Both public and private international law are
3
included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard categories.” This fit
the new European Union quite well, as Jessup himself explained:
The basic treaties are pure international law, as is the
rule which makes these treaties binding—pacta sunt
servanda. But the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice
of the European Communities shows that to a great
extent the law of the Communities is something
different-something which I would call "transnational,"
which may be in part international law in the sense in
which that term is used in Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, and partly law which
4
has certain other characteristics.
The core for our understanding of both Transnational Law and European Law (and,
incidentally, also Brexit) is to understand their relation to the state and to national
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sovereignty. For Jessup, states were, only one of many sets of actors, besides individuals,
organizations and corporations, and also supranational organizations. Sovereignty, for him,
did not disappear or become irrelevant, but it had become relative. Already, in a speech
from 1942, Jessup said as much: “If we can remove the snobbery and the selfishness from
our international thinking, really admitting that the principle of sovereignty is not a sacred
5
and unlimited thing, we shall be well on our way toward true international democracy.” In
Transnational Law, he argued that “in fact the sovereign’s power is neither exclusive nor
absolute within its own territory, and that this is true whether one is talking in terms of
6
legal or extralegal power.” He could have been speaking of the EU. Member States still
play a role, but they are one set of actors between individuals and regions, on the one
hand, and the supranational organization of the EU, on the other hand. Sovereignty does
not disappear but it is shared, as in Neil MacCormick’s insightful analysis of constitutional
7
pluralism that generated a whole field.
The Brexit movement, in rejecting the EU, rejected quite precisely the transnational law
character of the EU. Of course, this is not overt in every aspect. Sure, there was likely little
desire among the Leavers to reestablish legal categories such as public and private law. It
also seems unlikely that the Leave campaign was animated by the desire to reject the
problem-based regulatory style of the EU. What the campaign rejected, however, was the
transnational character of EU law. Leavers want laws to be national. At its heart, Brexit
represented a fundamentally legal concern: rules for Great Britain should be made by
Great Britain and its institutions. This links lawmaking and sovereignty with the idealized
th
sovereign state of 19 century international law: a British population without foreigners, a
firmly controlled territory controlled by closed borders, and a sovereign British
government that need not share authority with Brussels. And, remarkably, they also
emphasize the fourth element named as a requirement for a state in international law: the
ability to enter into relations with other states on its own terms. In other words, what the
Leave-voters wanted was sovereignty, both in its internal and its external aspects: a
Westphalian model of the world, in which states are internally sovereign, and in which
international relations are exclusively dealt with as matters between states.
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The Nostalgia of the Nation State
Much of this desire is driven by nostalgia for a past that never was. There is the right-wing
nostalgia for a Britain that was not only powerful and prosperous but also, by and large,
white. Some of this is nostalgia for Empire, a nostalgia both unrealistic and abhorrent.
More plausible is the nostalgia for the nation state. There is the left-wing nostalgia for a
functioning welfare state, for a strong left that can actually improve workers conditions
and can fight understandable fights with understandable enemies (workers against
capitalists). This hope for a return to the nation state is misguided. There is no way back.
th
The nation state in its 19 century idealized form is a mirage, and self-regulation in
isolation can no longer work.
Start with the idea of sovereignty. We know it to be a construct and a highly problematic
one. Krasner has called it, with some justification, organized hypocrisy. Jessup made the
point earlier, from a realist perspective:
The very existence of a government of a state is a
fiction, for a state is an intangible, and our international
law picture of a sovereign state never had life.
Sovereignty is essentially a concept of completeness. It
is also a legal creation, and as such, is a paradox, if not
an absolute impossibility, for if a state is a sovereign in
the complete sense, it knows no law and therefore
abolishes, at the moment of its creation, the jural
creator which gave it being. All juristic persons, indeed,
as Charles De Visscher has pointed out, are fictions
created by a superannuated doctrine which should be
8
discarded.
But the idea of the state as the fundamental entity is problematic in other ways. Insofar as
the dream of the Leavers is to go back to the nation state with a shared identity, the futility
of the dream is showing, not least from the voting results. A country cannot be said to
have a clear national identity if, in a referendum, it splits almost evenly on what that
identity is. Indeed, the split is not random but tracks various societal differentiations:
young versus old, urban versus rural, educated versus uneducated. The idea of one country
with one identity and one national interest is refuted by the results of the very referendum
that sought to reclaim the notion.

8

Philip C. Jessup, International Law in the Post-War World, 36 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 46, 49 (1942).

2016

Does Brexit Spell the Death of Transnational Law?

55

Indeed, the UK is one of the stranger models for a nation state, not least because it
consists of several nations: besides England, there are Wales, Scotland, and Northern
Ireland. Scotland and Northern Ireland voted with significant majorities to remain in the
EU. Both are now considering an exit from the UK in order to make that happen. The
Leavers run into the familiar conundrum from international law discussions on secession
and self-determination: if the UK can split from the EU, why should not Scotland split from
the UK? Why is it wrong for Brussels to make rules for London, but right for London to
make rules for Glasgow? Who is the self in self-governance?
9

There is one answer, and it should not be dismissed out of hand. One might say that
sovereignty does not require homogeneity of a shared identity. Quite the contrary: the
state is that very institution that provides robust procedures to create decisions that can
be accepted amongst diverse views. Nation states (especially the UK with its parliamentary
supremacy) provide the relevant institutions for democratic decision-making. They have
functioning parliaments, a functioning court system, a functioning government. And they
have elected officials who can be held accountable.
This seems plausible in theory but it has two shortcomings. First, it is not clear that voters
actually accept decisions made under the procedures provided by the state; the
referendum itself may be a test case. Second, and more importantly, it is not clear that the
state’s institutions are particularly well-versed for transnational problems. These
institutions remain national in their setup and in their functioning. As they stand, these
institutions are adequate for national, not transnational issues.
This is where the second mirage becomes evident, the mirage of self-governance. When
Jessup suggested that “the sovereign’s power is neither exclusive nor absolute within its
own territory,” he expressed an important fact. There are many issues that are effectively
decided outside of the sovereign. There are issues on which states are almost bound to
follow the demands from other states—not by law, but by necessity. Neighbors of the EU
know of the need to enact EU legislation in order to be compatible. Even seemingly robust
states strive to comply with EU data privacy standards in order to serve as “safe havens.”
Poorer countries have even less choice. They have to enact certain product and labor
standards in order to be allowed to export. They may have to grant foreign investors
specific privileges. Their sovereignty is formal, but in effect they are regulated from
elsewhere through economic pressures, even without the formalities of a system like the
EU. Jessup knew about this interdependence. British proponents of Brexit, if they did not,
will soon learn it.
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Jessup’s focus, in positing transnational law, was especially on problems that transcend
borders—which defines, at least traditionally, the limited competences of the EU. But
Jessup already demonstrated that there is no clear boundary between domestic and
10
transnational problems, and that traditional distinctions tend to be arbitrary.
Realistically, an increasing number of problems must be characterized as transnational,
and it is not surprising therefore that the EU has claimed ever broader competences. Now,
these transnational problems cannot be resolved through isolated self-regulation on the
level of the nation state. By necessity, citizens in or from several countries are involved—
the very justification for regulation at the EU level. Immigration concerns, which seem to
have been the biggest driver of the referendum’s outcome, show this nicely. Immigration
control can be defined as a national problem, but that is artificial. Immigration is by
definition a transnational problem: it concerns the immigration country, the emigration
country, the refugees in transit between the two, and also other countries that will need to
bear the costs of one country’s permissive or restrictive immigration policies. Much was
made of the claim that Angela Merkel, in accepting the European duty under international
law to accept masses of refugees, was indirectly imposing on other countries as well. But
the Brexit demand for self-regulation is, in itself, the demand that the UK should be
allowed to regulate refugees and thereby, indirectly, impose on other countries, without
giving them a say. That may be justifiable, but not as self-regulation.
Again, there is a more sophisticated version of this argument. It says that even when
problems are transnational they need not be regulated on a supranational level. It would
be better to resolve them through coordination among individual states, and such
regulation requires sovereign states. The Leavers made much of the UK’s enhanced ability
to enter into agreements, both with third countries and with the EU. And indeed, in many
ways, such decentralized regulation is often superior to supranational regulation. But it
seems questionable, to say the least, that such coordination is easier from outside than
from inside the EU. One can well speculate that a vote for Brexit is really largely a vote
against coordination, not for better coordination.
This is not to say that the EU is the optimal mechanism for coordination. It is not a mere
coordination institution, and one may well argue that its impulse for harmonization has
gone too far. But the Leavers grossly overestimate the space for political freedom that
Brexit creates. In view of existing networks, it will be very difficult for the UK to
independently negotiate better conditions and, thus, essentially secure more regulatory
space for itself than would have been possible from within the EU Switzerland and Norway
are sometimes named as models. But one would think the UK’s ambition goes beyond
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these autonomy and authority of these countries. Leaving the EU means escaping from
some outside influence, but it results in the UK losing even more influence.
The Nostalgia of Transnational Law
If the desire to return to the nation state is a sign of nostalgia, then why is it that so many
people prefer it over transnational law? One answer, I suggest, is perhaps surprising:
transnational law itself is marred by its own nostalgia. Nostalgia for Jessup can be viewed,
perhaps, in the frequency with which his book on Transnational Law is invoked as a book
for our, not its, time. Nostalgia for the European Union can be viewed, for example, in a
curious statement from 25 June 2016, in which the foreign ministers of the six original
founding Member States invoked the Community’s founding in 1957 and assure
11
themselves of that project’s continued importance. Both stem from a time that is no
th
longer ours. Just as we cannot go back to the 19 century sovereign state, so we cannot go
back to the mid-century world.
In many ways, reading Jessup’s Transnational Law, like reading statements around the
founding of the European Communities, is a journey into another time, the era of the Pax
Americana. That era was influenced by the recent experience of the catastrophe of two
World Wars, and it was characterized by an emerging Cold War. The first of these
experiences suggested the risk of nationalism, the second suggested the risk of
collectivism. Transnationalism and individualism, in the form of free markets, were the apt
responses. But this describes only what was to be rejected—in that time and in that place.
Beyond that, both Transnational Law and the European Community were hopeful projects.
Jessup’s Transnational Law exudes the optimism of its time: problems exist, but they can
be solved. There is some utopian quality to it, but it is a very finely chiseled and detailed
utopia. It is a manifesto of a generation that sees big tasks ahead but feels up to resolving
them, with the right instruments and the right attitude.
It is necessary, however, to consider carefully what these instruments and this attitude
were. Jessup’s approach to transnational law was influenced by legal realism: He suggested
that one should start with concrete problems rather than the abstract categories. What
was needed was expertise: not expertise in legal doctrine, but expertise in real world
11
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problems and their solutions. He trusted institutions and officials to display this kind of
expertise. He praised Mixed Arbitral Tribunals for their creativity in developing new and
attractive rules in the lack of established ones, and suggests that national judges should be
able to do something similar. At least in principle this is still the approach that the EU takes
in its lawmaking. Most secondary law is formulated as a response to a concrete problem
that has surfaced. One may well criticize the EU for its narrow focus on the problems
confronting a free market. One may also claim that the EU sometimes sees problems that
are not really there. But that does not change the methodological point.
What could be wrong about all this? For one, Brexit demonstrates that governance by
experts is unpopular. This should not just irrational. David Kennedy demonstrates in his
latest book some of the problems of expert-based governance and how it can lead to
12
injustice. There are many reasons for this, but the simplest may be this: it is
undemocratic. Expert-based governance depoliticizes decisions and turns them into
observable truths. Such depoliticization may have seemed appropriate in view of the
experience with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Today it has become problematic. In
the light of such expert opinions it appears that Brexit supporters relied on the power they
had: they may be wrong, their vote may not even be to their benefit, but at least they are
able to stick it to what they perceive as the elite.
This leads to a broader problem for transnational law, the problem of democratic
responsibility. Jessup speaks of the wealth of rules, he speaks of jurisdiction and he speaks
of choice of law, but he does not speak of accountability. Admittedly, Jessup spoke
13
forcefully for international democracy elsewhere. But even there, this democracy often
seemed more instrumental than intrinsically good. Democracy was important to fend off
the Soviet Union (that did not support it, at least in the Western way). But it is not clear
that it plays a role for the development of transnational law. And as for the EU, its
democratic deficit has never been fully resolved, and it is not clear that there is enough
political will to fix it. In many ways, the EU was set up precisely in order to overcome the
narrow national interests that make their way into national legislation.
Indeed, arguably, this anti-democratic position was once a virtue. In the aftermath of the
experience with Nazi Germany, the idea of populist control was deeply suspicious, at least
for Europe. In the European postwar mind, the depoliticization of important questions
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seemed a good thing: it made it possible to ensure that rational decisions would be taken.
In this story, what made the postwar world prosper and what made transnational law
successful was precisely that it held populist control in check. The international human
rights movement spoke truth to power, even where that power rests in overwhelming
popular majorities, and even where the “truth” was normative and contestable. The
emerging transnational commercial law was successful because it was able to free itself
from democratic state control. And the EU was able to hold national governments
accountable not just vis-à-vis foreigners but also vis-à-vis their own citizens, an aspect that
Christian Joerges has emphasized. The disdain for the leave voters is a successor to the
disdain for Nazi populism. Discord may exist within, not about, the system. This somewhat
restrained view of democracy is now seeing its limits: people revolt against decisionmaking process in which they do not feel represented.
This leads to a further aspect. For Jessup and for the European Union, the focus on the
individual was closely linked to a preference for competition and capitalist markets. Party
autonomy has been greatly expanded and private ordering has been celebrated. Not all
individualism in transnational law has this focus on markets; the human rights movement
is, in parts, anti-capitalist. Nonetheless, it appears that individualism itself is being rejected.
In Brexit we see this with particular strength. The hope of many of the Leavers was to
avoid the harsh individual competition of the common market, in favor of a national
community, whether in the leftist view of solidarity and the welfare state or the rightist
view of a racially homogeneous nation.
A final aspect follows from this, and it may be the most important one: Transnational law is
potentially elitist. Transnational law, like increased Europe-wide competition benefits
some and injures others—it benefits the British elites and the famous Polish plumber; it
hurts the British worker. If, as we know, the educated were against Brexit and the
uneducated were for it, then that may suggest that votes for Brexit were simply dumb. But
it may also suggest that the EU benefits the educated more than it benefits the
uneducated. Similarly, it is undoubtedly xenophobic and selfish to oppose human rights,
including rights for refugees. But it is at least understandable in view of the fact that, of
course, human rights for some individuals have spillover effects on others. This is a reason
why we usually do not leave decisions on human rights to a majority vote; the fact that the
Brexit referendum has such effects is one of the most unfortunate aspects.
The elitist potential of transnational law is no accident. It is a reflection of the new
stratification of world society, creating a transnational upper class that travels and
communicates freely across borders, and a national underclass that remains local and
cannot participate in the benefits of the upper class. In this sense, the solidarity amongst
nationalists worldwide is not paradoxical. Transnational law, insofar as it concerns
transnational problems, threatens to be the law of that transnational elite. It may care for
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the transnational underclass (especially migrants), but not the local underclass. As such, it
is no surprise that the underclass opposes it.
What Is to be Done
All of this does not suggest that transnational law is dead. The simple return to the nation
state is not the answer, despite the nostalgia that surrounds it. Transnational problems are
not solved by national laws in isolation. There is no alternative to transnational law. But we
must realize that transnational law has a dark underbelly. That underbelly was not so
visible in the 1950s, and maybe it was not so important. Today it is important and should
not be underestimated. Transnational law, like any other area, benefits some and hurts
others. It must be developed without nostalgia. That means that some aspects that are
often underappreciated must be addressed.
One of these aspects is elitism. Transnational law, by and large, is a project made by a
transnational elite, a transnational network of scholars and decision-makers. It is also,
widely, a network made for a transnational elite, namely those who benefit from
transnationalism, whether in its market liberal form or its human rights form.
Transnational law likes to take on the fate of the poor elsewhere—exploited workers in
Bangladesh, environmental victims in Ecuador. It does not always sufficiently endorse the
issues of the have-nots at home, especially where these have-nots display unattractive
characteristics such as racism and xenophobia. This is the problem of exclusion. Market
liberal transnationalists let the weak collapse. Leftist transnationalists let the xenophobes
collapse. It is no wonder, then that weak xenophobes most vociferously reject
transnationalism. The Brexit voters are those who felt excluded, and the disdain that we
pour on them suggests that they are not wrong in feeling that way. There is something
charming in the current movement for London to separate from the UK. But we cannot go
back to a Hanseatic League of transnational cosmopolitan, cities and leave only the
countryside to the nation states.
The lack of democratic accountability is a second, related problem. It is not enough to try
to extend the benefits from transnationalism to the have-nots because they may reject this
as paternalism—the fact that so many in the UK who oppose the EU are the ones who
benefit from it makes this clear. This is a particularly tricky challenge. We have come to
develop our ideas of democratic accountability in the nation state. This is why proponents
of democracy are among the opponents of transnational law and the EU. If that is not an
option, then better concepts of actual democracy, self-determination and accountability
are needed. Transnational law in Jessup’s conception did not provide for this; today it must
be found.
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A third problem concerns, ironically, Jessup’s favored approach to problem-solving. The
realist idea of law as a solution for a problem seemed attractive in many ways. Today we
realize that it underestimates the symbolic value of law. The Brexit nostalgia for the British
state is also a nostalgia for the symbolism of nationally made law, which has more
attraction than Brussels. There is no other explanation for the paradox that the leave
campaign voted in favor of the supremacy of a Parliament which itself, by a large majority,
is opposed to the Brexit. The European Union has always hoped to establish an identity
and a positive image; but its image remains that of a cold regulator of bananas. As
concerns marketing, transnational law may be able to learn from human rights law with its
widely shared positive image. But the problem is not merely one of marketing.
Transnational law must also take seriously that law itself has symbolic power. Law goes
beyond regulation—it aspires and inspires and expresses a vision of our better selves.
Jessup was aware of the power the have-nots could yield if their problems remained
unaddressed:
When such issues as we have been describing attain
certain proportions or degrees of intensity, something
is done about it. If it is not done by the haves, the havenots may resort to domestic violence, or to
international war, or to the General Assembly of the
14
United Nations.
Or to Brexit, one might add. For Jessup, transnational law was the answer to such issues.
For today’s have-nots today, transnational law is part of the problem. Transnational law
will need to regroup in order to respond to their plea.

[The author offers thanks for valuable comments to Jed Purdy]
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